Tag Archives: Supernaturalism

One Perspective on Christianity and Disability

Philosophy of Religion December 31, 2022 Leave a comment

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Introduction
In what follows, I will lay out some of the more problematic aspects of Christianity’s relationship with its members who are disabled. This will involve an exploration of Christian theology and a comparison with another, similarly harmful, approach to/worldview of disability known as the medical model.
NOTE: I realize that what is about to be said does not apply universally to all of Christianity or its denominations or its beliefs. But there are still people and denominations who hold to some of these beliefs or views, either directly or indirectly, and who propagate this mistreatment of people with disabilities, either purposefully or inadvertently. It it to these particular Christian individuals and groups that this article is predominantly addressed.

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The Incompatible Properties Argument(s) by T.M. Drange

Logic, Philosophy of Religion May 15, 2020 Leave a comment

[This article was originally published by Dr. Theodore Drange in Philo 1998 (2), pp. 49-60. It has been re-purposed here, eliminating most of Drange’s accompanying comments to anticipated objections. The intention here is just to provide the outlines of his argument(s) in their logical form(s) and promote awareness of the argument’s overall strength.]

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Atheological arguments (arguments for the nonexistence of God) can be divided into two main groups. One group consists of arguments which aim to show an incompatibility between two of God’s properties. Let us call those “incompatible-properties arguments.” The other group consists of arguments which aim to show an incompatibility between God’s existence and the nature of the world. They may be called “God-vs.-world arguments.” A prime example of one of those would be the Evidential Argument from Evil. This paper will only survey arguments in the first group. Arguments in the second group are discussed elsewhere.[1]

To generate incompatible-properties arguments, it would be most helpful to have a list of divine attributes. I suggest the following. God is:

(a) perfect                       (g) personal

(b) immutable                (h) free

(c) transcendent            (i) all-loving

(d) nonphysical              (j) all-just

(e) omniscient                (k) all-merciful

(f) omnipresent              (l) the creator of the universe

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A Critique of ‘The Argument from Desire’

Philosophy of Religion March 14, 2020 Comments: 3

Introduction
The Argument from Desire is an often overlooked argument that is both logically and emotionally appealing to theists. As Christian apologist Norman Geisler puts it, “it has a certain existential force.” 1 The Argument from Desire interprets seemingly universal desires and experiences of human beings, including those who may passionately declare themselves to be atheists, agnostics, or something else entirely, as evidence that points to the existence of Heaven specifically, but which is entailed by the existence of the Christian God more generally.

Though originally championed by C.S. Lewis in Mere Christianity, Pilgrim’s Regress, and The Problem of Pain 2, there have been numerous forms of the argument advanced in contemporary times. Some scholars, such as Norman Geisler and Art Lindsley 3, argue that the desire is one for immortality. Others state that it is a desire for everlasting joy, as Lewis himself did. Still others, such as Peter Kreeft, argue that this universal yearning is a desire for an intimate and lasting relationship with God, which likely entails the other two desires. This paper will focus mostly on the version of the Argument from Desire put forth by Christian apologist Peter Kreeft. 4 In the remainder of this paper, I will explore Kreeft’s argument in detail, providing criticisms and clarifications where appropriate applicable. 

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