This love is known by the Greeks as storge and is translated as “affection, especially of parents to offspring.” Lewis states that this type of love is the least discriminating. With Affection, people who we normally wouldn’t find appealing or who bother us or who just don’t deserve any kind of love are still lovable and can still be loved. “It ignores even the barriers of species.” But, as Lewis points out, there are criteria that must be met. Affection is not felt towards those who are not familiar. Affection cannot be, or at least is not, felt towards people or objects or animals that are unknown.
C.S. Lewis wrote a fascinating and truly insightful philosophical treatise into the four key forms or versions of what we in the English-speaking world would simply refer to as ‘Love.’ He did this by drawing upon the vast richness of the literary world, especially those tales woven during the Middle Ages and Early Modern Period. Lewis begins by differentiating between two potential functions of love: Gift love and Need love. In what follows, I’ll provide a multi-segmented summary of Lewis’s treatment of Love from a philosophical perspective.
Introduction In what follows, I will lay out some of the more problematic aspects of Christianity’s relationship with its members who are disabled. This will involve an exploration of Christian theology and a comparison with another, similarly harmful, approach to/worldview of disability known as the medical model.
NOTE: I realize that what is about to be said does not apply universally to all of Christianity or its denominations or its beliefs. But there are still people and denominations who hold to some of these beliefs or views, either directly or indirectly, and who propagate this mistreatment of people with disabilities, either purposefully or inadvertently. It it to these particular Christian individuals and groups that this article is predominantly addressed.
[This article was originally published by Dr. Theodore Drange in Philo 1998 (2), pp. 49-60. It has been re-purposed here, eliminating most of Drange’s accompanying comments to anticipated objections. The intention here is just to provide the outlines of his argument(s) in their logical form(s) and promote awareness of the argument’s overall strength.]
Atheological arguments (arguments for the nonexistence of God) can be divided into two main groups. One group consists of arguments which aim to show an incompatibility between two of God’s properties. Let us call those “incompatible-properties arguments.” The other group consists of arguments which aim to show an incompatibility between God’s existence and the nature of the world. They may be called “God-vs.-world arguments.” A prime example of one of those would be the Evidential Argument from Evil. This paper will only survey arguments in the first group. Arguments in the second group are discussed elsewhere.
To generate incompatible-properties arguments, it would be most helpful to have a list of divine attributes. I suggest the following. God is:
“Another school year is around the corner. Undergraduate biology students will once again take up their textbooks on a quest to explore the intricacies of life. Of course, these students are rarely exposed to a balanced assessment of evolutionary theory, including its empirical challenges.