Tag Archives: Ethics

Contra Ainslie: Multi-variable Measures of Akrasia

Throughout his explanation of akrasia as hyperbolic discounting, Ainslie focuses on the temporal dimensions of the discounting process, noting that when the possibility of experiencing satisfaction from a particular reward is less delayed, then the agent is more likely to engage in akratic actions or be swayed by akratic behavioral dispositions.

Ainslie uses the term “imminent” to describe how strongly an agent may feel an internal pull towards a particular reward and its accompanying satisfaction (Ainslie 30). “Imminent,” when properly understood within hyperbolic discounting, includes but should not be limited to temporal considerations. Akratic actions involve internal calculations guided by desire or emotion with an emphasis on, or at least a preference for, the likelihood of certainty in obtaining satisfaction from a reward. This aspect of certainty is what some psychological experiments mentioned by Ainslie fail to properly take into account.

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An Introduction to Akrasia

Skele Akrasia has traditionally been defined as “incontinence” or “weakness of will” and occurs when an agent, endowed with certain rational and volitional faculties (deliberation and free will), chooses a poorer course of action. Akrasia has wide-reaching implications for topics such as motivation (what causes akratic actions?), impulsiveness (how does one prevent akratic actions?), moral accountability (is akrasia similar enough to addiction or compulsion to warrant lesser moral culpability?), and the like. As scholar George Ainslie points out, the practical application of akrasia has been, and is currently being, studied by scholars coming from numerous disciplines including philosophy of mind, sociobiology, economics, neurophysiology, and cognitive psychology (Ainslie 7). The importance of understanding the concept and what it means for human beings should not be understated.

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Contra Haidt: A Short Critique of Schwitzgebel and Rust’s Empirical Studies

From Haidt’s impassioned rejection of the “rationalist delusion,” it is difficult to discern why Schwitzgebel and Rust would place such significance on the aforementioned behaviors as they pertain to ethicists versus non-ethicists. There are more morally egregious behaviors that ethicists could engage in would serve to overwhelmingly confirm the fact that they do not act more morally than others despite their professional status as moral philosophers. Yet, in the various articles published by Schwitzgebel and Rust, very little explanation is provided as to why these are truly relevant to determining whether moral philosophers behave better than those who may not have as extensive training or education in moral reasoning. In an article about the library habits of ethicists versus their non-ethicist counterparts, there is only one sentence provided as to why failure to return library books is bad (Schwitzgebel 714). Rather than justifying their choice of moral behaviors to research, Schwitzgebel and Rust spend most of their published articles explaining the methods they use.

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A Summary of “The Righteous Mind” by J. Haidt

JH

In his work “The Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion,” social psychologist Jonathan Haidt coins the term “the rationalist delusion” to explain a tendency of a majority of scholars to overemphasize the importance of rationality in human behavior throughout history (103). Haidt claims that the “worship of reason,” particularly within the realm of morality, is essentially inappropriate and he utilizes the rest of his book to advocate for a different version of moral reasoning and decision making processes based more on emotive intuitions that are dominant (103).

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The Nature of Communication between Physician and Patient in Western Medicine

One feature of Western medicine’s social institution that serves to maintain authority/power in the hands of the physician is insulating the layperson from properly understanding what may be ailing him/her. Illich defines this process as “medical mystification” (80). It is an intellectual obscuring of sorts and stems from the physician’s special knowledge and training as it pertains to the proper functioning of the human body.

The other part of this insulation between the patient and the physician lies in the style of communication between the two. In referring to this style, or mode, of communication one must not only look at the vocabulary utilized by the physician but also at the structure of conversation between the patient and physician such as when the former enters into a hospital for medical purposes.

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Moral Reasoning in the Context of Physician Assisted Suicide (PAS)

A Statement of Values — Proponents versus Opponents

Collectively, the proponents of physician assisted suicide value personal autonomy and responsibility, the quality of life, and compassion towards others. Proponents of physician assisted suicide feel that by being allowed to choose between life and death as a personal and medical decision, patients are able to exercise personal autonomy, a freedom that they take to be fundamental to the nature of humanity. This autonomy ties directly into their perceptions about quality of life, in that some view life as undesirable or lackluster if they are not able to enjoy activities, events, and relationships that they previously did due to terminal or incurable medical conditions. They do not view life as inherently valuable and worth living, but derive life’s value from its pragmatic and functional elements. When the level and intensity of physical and mental suffering crosses a certain threshold, these proponents value the actions of those who will show compassion and act in accordance with their final wishes. Thus, proponents of physician assisted suicide feel obligated to protect the personal rights of patients as well as to ensure that they are being treated with compassion to alleviate their pain and suffering. Any events or legislation that interfere with those conditions are intolerable.

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Conscientious Objection: Some Thoughts

What I think I find most problematic about Conscientious Objection, or at least what lays the groundwork of my distaste for it, is its unique context. To put it more straightforwardly, Conscientious Objection can, but does not always, involve genuine cases of life and death.

Rather than considering one-off examples, let’s try a cluster approach.

i. A woman is in dire medical need of an abortion; if she does not receive an abortion, she will inevitably die during childbirth. If she lives, the fetus will die and vice versa.

ii. A woman is in significant medical need of an abortion; if she does not receive an abortion, she will inevitably suffer permanent physiological damage. If the fetus lives, she will live but in immense pain for the rest of her life. If she lives (i.e. has an abortion), the fetus will die.

iii. A woman is not in any medical need of an abortion; she elects to abort the fetus within the federally and state regulated timelines allowed to do so.

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2 Brief Yet Excellent Introductions to Meta-Ethics!

This first video above does a great job of presenting the basic contours of the field in an easy-to-follow manner. 

This second video below does a greater job of doing so while digging a little bit deeper on the details. 

If you get a chance, make sure to watch both!

‘Moral Blind Spots’ by Gerald Jones: A Brief Critique

Introduction and Overview

Gerald Jones has recently published a fascinating article in PhilosophyNow magazine entitled ‘Moral Blind Spots.’ Though the content of his article is multi-faceted (e.g. nodding to topics in transhumanism, historical revisionism, and metaethics) and ultimately addresses the moral imperatives behind veganism and vegetarianism, what piqued my interest was the extended analogy that Jones developed to compare physical deficiencies involving one’s eyesight with moral deficiencies. Continue reading

Findings from a Dictionary of Philosophy

 

Recently I had the urge to read up on some terms and concepts from the philosophy of religion, for clarification purposes. The work I chose (because I had online access to it) was “The Dictionary of Philosophy of Religion” written by Charles Taliaferro. Most of the terms I already knew by description or experience but I didn’t know them by their proper names. So, I figured that I would share some of the more interesting finds.

 

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